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DUAL PRACTICE OF LAW AND AC-
COUNTANCY: A LAWERY'S PARADOX
Louis S. GOLDBERG*
If a man is qualified both as a lawyer and as a certified public
accountant, is there any reason to prohibit him from practicing
both professions at the same time? The Professional Ethics Com-
mittee of the ABA thinks so, but the author of this article, a
lawyer-CPA himself, strongly disagrees. He argues that the Com-
mittee's position is not in the public interest, not a proper interpre-
tation of the Canons of Ethics, and perhaps even unconstitutional.
N 1961 THE Professional Ethics Committee1 of the American
Bar Association rendered Opinion 297,2 proclaiming that the dual
practice of law and accountancy by one trained in both professions
violated the Canons of Professional Ethics. This opinion has been
adopted by a few state bar associations and rejected by others; most
of the states are neutral.3
I believe that it is perfectly proper for a lawyer qualified as a
certified public accountant to practice both professions concurrently.
Ethically conducted in the true tradition of both professions, dual
practice serves a genuine public interest and suitably performs
the proper functions of both. To suppress or restrict the dual prac-
tice is a disservice to the bar and to the public, and such suppression
or restriction is not only unwarranted but is constitutionally im-
permissible.
I
THE BACKGROUND
A. History
To view the issues in proper perspective, the controversies,
negotiations, and accords between the two professions during the
0 A.B. College of the City of New York; LL.B. 1919, Fordham University. Member,
Iowa Bar. President, American Association of Attorney-Certified Public Accountants.
'Hereinafter frequently referred to as Ethics Committee.
2 CoMmTrr= ON PROFEsSIONAL ETHICS & GRIEVANcES, ABA, OPINIONs 8 (Supp. 1964)
(Lawyer-Accountant Relationship, Opinion 297, 1961).
'For the views of bar associations rejecting the opinion, see part V of this article.
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past quarter-century must be reviewed. The story begins in the early
1940's. By that time a goodly number of hardy professional people
had qualified themselves in both professions and were engaged in
their concurrent practice. The simple fact that they existed and
prospered attested to the public need, interest, and acceptance of
dual practice.
By that time, too, the National Conference of Lawyers and
Certified Public Accountants had been established. It was com-
posed of a committee of lawyers selected by the American Bar As-
sociation and a committee of certified public accountants selected
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 4 The
National Conference was designed to collaborate on problems
common to the two professions.
On March 4, 1946, the National Conference promulgated certain
questions touching on dual practice. These questions were pre-
sented both to the ABA Ethics Committee through the ABA Com-
mittee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law, and to the Pro-
fessional Ethics Committee of the AICPA.5 The latter declined to
declare itself opposed to the dual practice," a position to which it has
consistently adhered to the present time. The Ethics Committee of.
the ABA, on the other hand, issued on October 25, 1946, its Opinion
272,7 which condemned dual practice from a single office, but, be-
cause of a lack of unanimity in the Committee, did not foreclose the
possibility of dual practice from separate offices.8
At about this same time there arose the unfortunate and un-
seemly conflict between the two professions concerning their
respective roles in tax practice, culminating in the celebrated
case of New York County Lawyers Ass'n v. Bercu, in which the
' The AICPA was at that time denominated the American Institute of Accountants.
The organization will be referred to as the former throughout this article.
5 The full text of the answers formulated by both committees appears in 83 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 171-75 (1947).
0 Id. at 172.
7 COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics & GRIEVANCES, ABA, OPINIONS 565 (1957)
(Opinion 272, 1946). This opinion was superseded by Opinion 297.
8id. at 569.
9 273 App. Div. 524 (1948), 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), aff'd mem., 299 N.Y. 728, 87
N.E.2d 451 (1949). Another significant case is Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807,
273 P.2d 619 (Super. Ct. 1954), where an accountant was denied compensation because
his services had unlawfully included a decision on a question of tax law.
The conflict between the two professions concerning tax practice alerted many
members of each profession to the desirability of becoming qualified in the other,
and as a result, the number of dually-qualified practitioners has increased considerably
since 1950.
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ABA and the AICPA opposed each other as amici curiae in the
New York Court of Appeals.
While this controversy on tax practice was pending, the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants
suspended its meetings. By 1951, harmony had been restored, and
in that year the National Conference approved a joint Statement
of Principles to regulate the interface between the two professions.
It was approved by the ABA Board of Governors on February 24,
1951,10 by the ABA House of Delegates on February 27, 1951,11 and
by the Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants on May 8, 1951.12 It has thus been officially accepted by
the highest authority in both professional organizations. The State-
ment of Principles continues in effect to this date, without modifi-
cation. It is republished annually in the Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory13 and in the Annual Reports of the ABA. 14 It does not
deal expressly with the theme of dual practice, but it does stress
that the joint skills of the two professions are "in the best public
interest '15 and that both the ABA and the AICPA "set a high
standard of professional practice and conduct, including prohibition
of advertising and solicitation."'16
On February 24, 1961, the ABA Ethics Committee promulgated
its Opinion 297, superseding Opinion 272 and all other formal and
informal opinions dealing with this subject. Opinion 297 squarely
declares, for the first time, that the dually qualified person "must
choose between holding himself out as a lawyer and holding himself
out as an accountant."'1
7
Opinion 305,18 issued in 1962, adds nothing that is material
here. Informal Decision 565,19 also issued in 1962, declares that the
use of separate letterheads will not satisfy Opinion 297 and that
IoSee 76 A.B.A. REP. 559 (1951).
"See id. at 529.
12 See 91 J. ACCOUNTANCY 801, 802 (1951).
128 MAR InDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECroRY 189A (1966).
1 4The latest republishing is 89 A.B.A. REP. app. 85-86 (1964).
"Id. at app. 85.
•Ibid.
17COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & GRIEVANcES, ABA, OPINIONS 11 (Supp.
1964) (Opinion 297, 1961).
18 COMMrrrE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & GRIEVANCES, ABA, OPINIONS 28 (Supp.
1964) (Lawyer-Accountant Relationship, Opinion 305, 1962).
2'COMMrrTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, ABA, INFORMAL DECISION 565 (1962), sum-
marized in Combirrm ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIC$ & GRIEVANCES, ABA, OPINIONS 52 (Supp.
1964).
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dual listings in directories and law lists are "directly contrary to the
basic principle" 20 of Opinion 297.
Some bar associations have rejected Opinion 297, some have
taken a position of neutrality, some have adopted the Opinion but,
have refrained from enforcement. Other bar associations have under-
taken enforcement on a "person by person" basis, with no attempt
at judicial enforcement against those not yielding to non-court
pressures.
B. The Authoritative Sources of Disciplining the Profession
As officers of the courts, lawyers are required to meet certain
ethical standards, in order to maintain a high order of integrity
throughout the judicial system. These ethical standards have come
to be equated with the ABA Canons of Ethics. But what actual
force do the Canons possess? The Illinois Supreme Court has noted
that "the canons of ethics of the State and American Bar Associa-
tions are not binding obligations and are not enforced by the courts
as such; however, they constitute a safe guide for professional con-
duct and an attorney may be disciplined for not observing them."21
The United States Supreme Court, in upholding Judicial Canon
85 last year, pointed out that "Canon 35, of course, has of itself no
binding effect on the courts but merely expresses the view of the
Association in opposition to the broadcasting, televising and photo-
graphing of court proceedings. '22
While not possessing binding effect, however, the Canons have
been adopted by some courts as a guide.23 At least in these states,
then, and probably in all states, the Canons will carry great weight
in determining what is and what is not ethically permissible con-
duct.
The opinions of the ABA Professional Ethics Committee are
purportedly interpretations of the Canons. As such, they are in-
herently less authoritative than the Canons themselves.24 This in-
20 COMMiTrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHcs, ABA, INFORMAL DECISION 565 (1962).
211 n re Heirich, 1D Ill. 2d 357, 386-87, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839-40 (1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 805 (1957).
22 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
28 E.g., In re Krasner, 32 In. 2d 121, , 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Heirich,
10 II. 2d 357, 386-87, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839-40 (1956), cert. denied, 355 US. 805 (1957);
Shapiro v. Wendell Packing Co., 366 Mich. 289, 294, 115 N.W.2d 87, 89 (1962); In the
Matter of Duffy, 19 App. Div. 2d 177, 179, 242 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1963); In the Matter
of Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 469, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 129 (1963).
21 See, e.g., In the Matter of Stein, 1 N.J. 228, 286, 62 A.2d 801, 805 (1949); State
v. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519,'524, 123 N.W.2d 452, 455 (1963).
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herent limitation is specifically recognized in the ABA framework.
It is the Board of Governors, not the Ethics Committee, which
"may censure, suspend or expel any member for cause, '" 25 and such
action is taken "upon the recommendation of the Committee on
Professional Grievances" 26 and then only after hearing. The role
of the Committee on Professional Ethics is a narrow one. It shall
"formulate and recommend standards of ethics and conduct in the
practice of law as a profession" 27 and "express its opinion concern-
ing proper professional or judicial conduct, but these opinions shall
not deal with questions of judicial decision or judicial discre-
tion .... ',28 The rules of procedure of the Committee expressly
provide that "the Committee will not render opinions on questions
of Law,"29 and that "the Committee will render opinions . . .
involving the ethics of the past conduct of a lawyer upon the request
only of the Committee on Professional Grievances ....- 80
None of the opinions here under discussion has been approved
by the ABA Board of Governors or the ABA House of Delegates
or the ABA membership. Like all opinions, they are simply Com-
mittee interpretations, adopted by the Committee, without hearing
or opportunity for opposing comment. To the best of my knowl-
edge and belief, the American Bar Association has never undertaken
enforcement of these Committee interpretations, through the ABA
Grievances Committee or in any other manner.
Thus it seems conclusively clear that the opinions of the ABA
Ethics Committee possess only such force as may flow from the
considered views on matters of ethics of the eight men who from
time to time compose the Committee. The opinions are not neces-
sarily a correct interpretation of the Canons; they do not constitute
the "law" of any bar association, nor the law of the land; they do
not fix or determine the public policy of state or nation; they have
no binding force or effect; a failure to observe them, or any one of
them, does not constitute grounds for disciplinary action. It is true
that the opinions do often carry weight in state disciplinary pro-
ceedings81 But no court in any state has adopted or approved
2" ABA CONSr. art. IL § 3, in 89 A.B.A. REP,. app. 2 (1964).
28 Ibid.
ABA BY-LAws art. X, § 7 (x) (1), in 89 A.B.A. REP. app. 35 (1964).
2ABA By-LAws art. X, § 7 (x) (3), in 89 AB.A. REP. app. 35 (1964).
2" Rule I (1), in COMMITrE ON PROFFSSIONAL ETHics & GRMVANCES, ABA, OPINIONs
80 (Supp. 1964).
"0Rule 11(2), in id. at 80-81. (Emphasis added.)
31 E.g., cases cited note 23 supra.
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Opinion 297 or any of its predecessors. And, as pointed out pre-
viously, only a few state bar associations have adopted it.
State bar committees, and eventually the courts, are thus wholly
uncommitted and free to determine, with the Canons and not
necessarily the opinions "as a guide," whether the dual practice
may, in the public interest, be suppressed or restricted by the law
or policy of the state; and the determination must be made subject
to the strictures of both state and federal constitutions.
II
OPINION 297
Opinion 297 declares that "it is a violation of Canon 27 for a
lawyer to hold himself out as qualified to practice both law and
accounting."8 2 This is so, says the Committee, because "the dual
holding out . . . constitutes self-touting, and because the lawyer-
accountant firm would almost inevitably serve as a feeder to the
legal firm."83 The result is that the CPA-lawyer "must choose be-
tween holding himself out as a lawyer and holding himself out as
an accountant."3 4 And if he chooses the latter, "he must not prac-
tice law or he will violate Canon 27 in that he will be using his
activity as an accountant to feed his law practice.", 5
But Opinion 297 encourages the lawyer to do accounting work:
The employment by a firm of lawyers of a public accountant on
a salaried basis for the purpose of doing accounting work for the
law firm in its practice of the law does not in and of itself result
in the law firm being engaged in unethical conduct.
If he elects to hold himself out as a lawyer, he will not violate
any Canon of Ethics merely because in rendition of legal services
he utilizes and applies accounting principles.35
Canon 27, which Opinion 297 purports to interpret, reads in
pertinent part as follows:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by cir-
culars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communi-
cations or intervieiv not warranted by personal relations.
82COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & GRIEVANCES, ABA, OPINIONS 11 (Supp.
1964) (Opinion 297, 1961).
8 3 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
s3 Ibid.
'sld. at 10-11. (Emphasis-added.)
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Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the im-
portance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation,
offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are
reprehensible; but the customary use of simple professional cards
is not improper.8 7
The Committee's position is that self-laudation is present in viola-
tion of Canon 27 when a lawyer permits the public to know that
he is also a member of another recognized profession and is engaged
in practice as such. At the same time, Opinion 297 would leave
the lawyer, as a lawyer, free to range over virtually the whole field
of accounting practice, however limited his accounting competence
might in fact be.
It is interesting to compare this view with the one officially an-
nounced by the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants in 1947, after invitation by the ABA to join in declaring the
dual practice to be unethical:
Both the American Bar Association and the American Insti-
tute of Accountants maintain rules against advertising, solicitation,
and division of fees with the "laity," a term which in the view of
each profession applies to members of the other.38
The Institute. therefore declined to pronounce the concurrent
practice to be unethical. It said: "the practice of law by a member
of the Institute who was a member of the bar as well as a certified
public accountant, would not be incompatible or inconsistent with
the practice of public accounting." 39
III
DOES OPINION 297 PROPERLY INTERPRET THE CANONS?
In all problems of legal ethics, the public interest is paramount;
every authoritative statement on ethics so declares. A basic premise
so obvious would seem to foreclose discussion were it not un-
fortunately true that too many lawyers regard the Canons as a bill
of rights enacted solely for their own benefit.
s ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 5 (1962).
83 J. AccourrANcy 171 (1947).9Id. at 172.
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The Canons are currently being reviewed by a Special Commit-
tee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards.4" Former President Powell
has said "many aspects of the practice of law have changed dras-
tically" since the Canons originally were adopted in 1908.41
"They... should be reexamined particularly in view of the increased
recognition of the public responsibility of our profession. '42
Article I of the ABA constitution states that the Association's
"objects shall be ... to uphold the honor of the profession of law;
to apply its knowledge and experience in the field of the law to the
promotion of the public good; ... in the interest of the legal pro-
fession and of the public."43 The Preamble to the Canons recites:
"The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our
maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so main-
tained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our pro-
fession are such as to merit the approval of all just men." 44
In 1942 the ABA Ethics Committee recognized that common
sense and the public interest are the appropriate tests in the in-
terpretation of the Canons: In Opinion 244 the Committee an-
nounced that the Canons are to be "interpreted in accordance with
their spirit and intent, in order to prevent the abuses at which they
were obviously aimed, as distinguished from a technical or literal
construction which would have them cover practices not generally
regarded by the Bar as inherently improper or unethical." 45
To determine whether Opinion 297 is a proper and correct in-
terpretation of the Canons, therefore, it is necessary at all times to
keep the public interest in mind. With this fact in view, let us
proceed to investigate the wisdom of Opinion 297.
A. Advertising and Self-Laudation
Canon 27 prohibits advertising and self-laudation.4" But the
only self-laudation involved when a lawyer is known to be a certified
public accountant is laudable laudation, impliedly approved by
Canon 27 itself. Canon 27 declares, as reprehensible, only "all other
40 89 A.B.A. REP. 381-83 (1964).
'ld. at 381.
" Ibid.
'* ABA CONST. art. I, in 89 A.BA. REP. app. 1 (1964).
"4 ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL E-Tcs 3 (1962).
45 COMMITEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics & GRIEVANCES, ABA, OPmIONS 488-89 (1957)
(Opinion 244, 1942).
11 See text of Canon 27 accompanying note 37 supra.
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like self-laudation"; 47 to be known as a CPA is so utterly unlike the
proscribed conduct indicated in Canon 27 as to merit commenda-
tion, not condemnation. Far from "offend[ing] the tradition and
lower[ing] the tone"48 of the legal profession, the honor and dignity
of the lawyer are enhanced when he achieves the difficult and
coveted CPA certificate.
The Committee would bring down the curtain to shut off from
the eyes and ears of the public any intimation that these superior
accounting skills are available. But does merely allowing the public
to know that one is a CPA constitute "advertising"? Mr. Drinker
has said, "where publicity is the normal by-product of able and
effective service, whether of a professional or non-professional char-
acter, this is a kind of 'advertisement' which is entirely right and
proper."49 If the fruits of meritorious performance in non-account-
ing areas are to be extolled, are those flowing from accounting ex-
cellence to be condemned as reprehensible? All that a lawyer is
(through charm or force of- personality) and all that a lawyer does
(in practice, in his club, in the community) tend to enhance or
diminish his stature as lawyer; why should it be considered other-
wise as to accounting practice?
The proper answer is that Canon 27 will bear no such interpre-
tation. Canon 27 is directed to the end that lawyers shall not dis-
credit their high calling by unseemly advertising. The aim of
Canon 27 is not to conceal the lawyer's skills; it does not seek to
withhold from the public the knowledge of the existence of those
talents. It is designed only to repress the unseemly. The announce-
ment that one is a CPA can hardly be placed in that category.
B. Solicitation: The "Feeder" Contention
Opinion 297 asserts that Canon 27 is violated "because the
lawyer-accountant firm would almost inevitably serve as a feeder
to the legal firm."50 The Committee's fear of "feeding" is at the
heart of the case; the fear is one of "unfair competition."
Canon 27 does not mention "feeding"; it is concerned with ad-
vertising and solicitation. Feeding must therefore be reprehensible
7 See text of Canon 27 accompanying note 37 supra. (Emphasis added.)
48 See text of Canon 27 accompanying note 37 supra.
19 DRINKE, LEcAL ETHICS 218 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER].
0 CoMMIT'EE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & GIEVANCES, ABA, OPINIONS 11 (Supp.
1964) (Opinion 297, 1961).
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because it constitutes a form of solicitation. Absent any evidence
of actual solicitation, the charge is that the concurrent practice,
however ethically conducted under the regulations of both profes-
sions, per se constitutes solicitation.
To serve as a feeder implies some overt activity of solicitation
not otherwise available to the professional man. What, then, is
solicitation? In the case of In re Heirich the court noted that
"solicitation of business ...is inimical to the good reputation of
the bar."51 But the decision continued: "Courts, however, have re-
frained from defining what constitutes such solicitation and have
frequently stressed the motive of the solicitation in determining its
propriety."5 2 To the extent that motive is relevant, it would seem
that the desire to serve the public in another recognized profession
is a laudable motive.
But let us assume that feeding is present. Wherein lies the
mischief? Every well-established law practice becomes such through
excellence of service; a job well done is the best of feeders. A
satisfied client returns and brings his friends.
In brief, except for actual solicitation, it is immaterial whether
the concurrent practice does or does not result in feeding the prac-
tice of either profession. In any particular case, it may or it may
not;. moreover, it may well result in negative feeding, in starving,
one or the other or both. In these respects, the concurrent practice
differs not at all from the great host of other potential sources of feed-
ing. The concurrent practice fulfills an important public need; feed-
ing, if any there be, is purely secondary and is a normal by-product of
satisfactory service.58
It has long been recognized that a lawyer may engage in other
businesses so long as he does not use either his law practice or al-
ternate business to' aid the other.54 Presumably the practice of
10 IMI. 2d 857, 887, 140 N.E.2d 825, 840, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 805 (1957).
11 10 I1. 2d at 887, 140 N.E.2d at 840.
:3See Comment, 8 U.C.L.A.L. R v. 360, 368-70 (1956).
I' See DPnNFda 221-22, and authorities cited therein. Lawyers in the United States
engage in a wide variety of activities. "[M]any lawyers besides practicing law are en-
gaged in other gainful activity. . . . Lawyers are .. .widely occupied in political
affairs. In 1965, five members of the President's Cabinet, sixty-seven United States
Senators and a majority of the members of the House of Representatives were lawyers.
Many governmental agencies are headed by lawyers .... The chief characteristic of
the professional activity of American lawyers is its rich variety." AMEJUCAN BAR FOUN-
DATION, THE LE.AL PROFESSION IN rIM UNITED STATES 1-2 (1965).
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accounting is so close to the practice of law as to inherently con-
stitute mutual feeding. But underlying this contention is the
premise that the CPA-lawyer practices exclusively business law-
taxation and the like. There is no reason to assume that the CPA-
lawyer does not also practice in other areas of the law where his
accounting work will bear no relationship to his legal practice.
Whenever a lawyer engages in another business, that business
will inevitably act as a feeder for certain aspects of his law practice;
it seems clearly arbitrary to single out CPAs for prohibition of dual
practice. By similar reasoning, doctor-lawyers should be prohibited
from dual practice because of the obvious connection in personal
injury cases. Lawyers should be prohibited from selling insurance;
from being real estate brokers; from holding public office. All such
activities tend to directly feed certain aspects of the lawyer's prac-
tice. Conversely, the CPA-lawyer who handles solely personal in-
jury cases should be allowed to maintain a dual practice.
These conclusions, which seem to follow inevitably from the
decision of the Ethics Committee, illustrate the fallacy of the Com-
mittee's approach-an approach which seeks to prevent activities, no
matter how ethically conducted, which will feed the law practice.
Carried to its extreme, it would ban all outside activities of the
lawyer, or at least prevent him from practicing in any area con-
nected with his activities. The proper approach is the one that has
always been used-to require the lawyer to refrain only from un-
seemly feeder practices, and to discipline him when and if he
engages in them.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants of-
ficially rejected the Committee's "feeder" contentions in 194655
and still rejects them. It refused to be concerned with the fear
of feeding, because the rules of both professions "are similar with
respect to fee-splitting, advertising, and solicitation"5 6 and observed
that "any attempt by a member of the Institute to evade existing
rules [of the accounting profession] . . . could be dealt with quite
readily under the provisions" 57 of those rules. Similarly, any viola-
tion by a lawyer is clearly a call for discipline under the Canons of
Ethics.
55 See 83 J. AccouNTANC-Y 171-73 (1947).
"OId. at 172.
57 Ibid.
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C. Practice of a "Specialty"
It is generally impermissible for a lawyer to hold himself out as a
"specialist" in one area of the law. But accounting is not a "spe-
cialty"; by definition, to engage in law and accounting conjointly
is dual practice of two professions. Accounting is an independent,
legally-recognized, strictly-governed profession, entitled to its own
separate and distinct identification.
The distinction emerges with clarity when we recall that the
National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants,
in their joint 1951 Statement of Principles, agreed that:
An accountant should not describe himself as a "tax consul-
tant" or "tax expert" or use any similar phrase. Lawyers, sim-
ilarly, are prohibited by the canons of ethics of the American Bar
Association and the opinions relating thereto, from advertising
a special branch of law practice.58
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has adopted
the full text of the foregoing section, with the express provision
that any violation invites expulsion or suspension from the Insti-
tute.59 At the same time, the Institute adheres to its position that
the dual practice is not incompatible.
I Hence, the distinction is clear: Identification of a professional
practice is not a "prohibited self-designation" of a specialty. The
CPA is governed by statutory and professional rules of conduct that
parallel those of the bar; and the concurrent practice is subject to
the rules of both professions.
Why, then, cannot a lawyer designate himself as also being a
CPA? A clear analogy can be drawn to the allowance by Canon 27
of self-designation by a proctor in admiralty or patent attorney.0
These exceptions are presumably allowed because such a specialist
is more than merely proficient in one area; he has also met certain
standards prescribed by official authority and is subject to the sanc-
89 A.B.A. REP. app. 86 (1964).
' Committee on Professional Ethics, AICPA, Prohibited Self-Designations (Opinion
No. 5), in AICPA, BY-LAWS & CODE OF PRoFESSIONAL ETnics 39 (1965).
60
"It is not improper for a lawyer who is admitted to practice as a proctor
in admiralty to use that designation on his letterhead or shingle or for a lawyer
who has complied with the statutory requirements of admission to practice before the
patent office, to so use the designation 'patent attorney' or 'patent lawyer' or 'trade-
mark attorney' or 'trademark lawyer' or any combination of those terms." ABA,
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs 5 (1962) (Canon 27).
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dons which that authority may impose. The CPA meets these tests
by definition.
D. Ethical Standards in the Accounting Profession
The Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants includes the following:
1.02 A member or associate shall not commit an act discreditable
to the profession.
1.03 A member or associate shall not violate the confidential
relationship between himself and his client.
3.01 A member or associate shall not advertise his professional
attainments or services.
Publication in a newspaper, magazine or similar medium
of an announcement or what is technically known as a card
is prohibited.
[Directory listing is rigidly restricted.] ...
3.02 A member or associate shall not endeavor, directly or indi-
rectly, to obtain clients by solicitation.
4.04 A member or associate shall not engage in any business or
occupation conjointly with that of a public accountant,
which is incompatible or inconsistent therewith.
4.05 A member or associate engaged in an occupation in which
he renders services of a type performed by public account-
ants, or renders other professional services, must observe
the by-laws and Code of Professional Ethics of the Institute
in the conduct of that occupation.61
In addition, the Institute's by-laws provide:
A member or associate renders himself liable to expulsion
or suspension by the trial board or a sub-board thereof if
(b) he infringes any of these by-laws or any provision of
the Code of Professional Ethics .... 6.2
State statutes regulating the practice of accountancy generally
empower the state board of accountancy to adopt rules of profes-
sional conduct.63 Such rules have virtually the force of law; in-
fringement may, depending upon the gravity of the offense, result
61 AICPA, BY-LAws & CODE OF PrEsOFsIoNAL ETucS 31, 34, 35 (1965).6Art. V, § 4, AICPA, BY-LAws & CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 7 (1965).
68 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.04 (1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.2 (1957); N.Y.
EDuc. LAW § 7406 (Supp. 1965).
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in revocation of the license to practice or other milder sanctions.0 4
These state rules usually adopt the Code of Professional Ethics of
the Institute.
These standards for CPAs parallel the Canons of Ethics and, in
some respects, are even more stringent. If the basic aim of the
Canons is to prevent unethical conduct on the part of lawyers,
it is difficult to perceive how conduct meeting these standards could
bring any form of ill repute to the legal profession or the judicial
system.
E. Summary
It thus appears that Opinion 297 is attempting to speak in terms
of what is desirable, and not in terms of what is mandatory. And it
does not do even this very well. It is desirable that every lawyer
in America achieve the topmost heights of professional capacity,
but if the privilege of practice were confined to those who attain the
summit, how thin the ranks of the bar would bel All that a lawyer
does adds to his stature in the profession or diminishes it; to engage
in the practice of accountancy may in the one case add or in the
other case diminish, depending largely on individual diligence and
industry. A lawyer may engage in church functions, or in horse-
racing and dice; all detract from his professional time, and for
better -or for worse affect his standing as a lawyer. Shall all such
activities be permitted, or all proscribed, or all officially ignored?
As to all these themes, we can and should have ideals; but it will
hardly do to prescribe rigid rules, save at the recognized boundaries
of moral conduct.
IV
THE PUBLIC INTEPMST
Having examined Opinion 297 as a proper or improper interpre-
tation of the Canons of Ethics, let us now turn our attention to its
wisdom as a broader matter of furthering the public interest.
In 1946, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
perceptively pinpointed the overriding factor of public interest:
In any case, we believe, [questions of feeding] ... are of secondary
importance in view of the primary justification for rules of pro-
fessional conduct or ethics, that is, to safeguard the public interest.
61E.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5100 (Supp. 1965); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 18.25
(1957); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 7406 (Supp. 1965).
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The compelling consideration, in our opinion, is the desirability
of allowing the public complete freedom in the selection of lawyers
or certified public accountants who the public believes can render
most effectively the professional services it desires.65
The public interest is best served by the joint skills of the two
professions; this truth is attested to in unison by the highest authority
of both professions in a single document. The Statement of Prin-
ciples adopted by the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified
Public Accountants declares in part:
Frequently the legal and accounting phases are so inter-related
and interdependent and overlapping that they are difficult to
distinguish....
In many cases, therefore, the public will he best served by utiliz-
ing the joint skills of both professions.6
The contention that an agreement for joint service by a lawyer
and an accountant in a tax case was illegal because the CPA was
practicing law "in partnership" with the attorney was rejected in
1963 by the New York Court of Appeals:
An arrangement such as was here arrived at assures the sort
of co-operative effort whereby the expertise of both lawyer and
accountant in their respective fields may be availed of and
is designed to achieve for the client who retained them -the best
possible result. Indeed, such an arrangement comes close to the
ideal setup contemplated by [the Statement of Princip.les] .... 67
If the arrangement in this case came close to the ideal, is not
that ideal more fully realized in the concurrent practice of the CPA-
lawyer? That is the conclusion stated at the close of a Note in the
Harvard Law Review:
The combination in one person of the functions of lawyer and
accountant, representing the ultimate degree of co-operation be-
tween the two professions, would give the client the advantage of
more continuous and timely professional supervision. This fea-
ture would seem especially valuable to the small businessman who
can afford only limited professional assistance.68
61,83 J. ACCOUNTANCY 171, 172-73 (1947).
68 89 A.BA. REP. app. 85-86 (1964).
67 Blumenberg v. Neubecker, 12 N.Y.2d 456, 460, 191 N.E.2d 269, 271, 240 N.Y.S.2d
730, 732 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
e8 Note, 63 HARv. L. R v. 1457, 1458 (1950).
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This "valuable feature" is not limited to the small businessman.
Sheldon S. Cohen, CPA and attorney, was confirmed by the Senate
as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, far from a small business, in
January 1965. Secretary of the Treasury Dillon hailed Mr. Cohen
as an expert in both. accounting and law. 9 The "joint skills ideal"
has also entered the area of criminal law; in recent major financial
crimes in New York City:
The cases were prepared by Assistant District Attorney Oscar
J. Cohen, together with Edgerton Hazard, CPA. Both are on the
staff of District Attorney Frank S. Hogan. This reflects a new
technique established by the DA's office of combining the experi-
ence and abilities of lawyers and CPA's to ferret out and prosecute
financial crimes.70
To applaud the joint skills and the public's need of them, on
the one hand, and to withhold from the public any knowledge of
where those skills may be enlisted, appears manifestly inconsistent.
It is like the physician telling the patient what medicine is best for
him but refusing to let him know where he can get it.
Several more specific objections have been raised to dual prac-
tice: (1) he who practices both professions cannot be proficient in
either one; (2) dual practice poses an inconsistency between the
role. of the CPA as an "impartial" evaluator and the role of the
lawyer as an "advocate"; (3) dual practice confuses and may destroy
the protection of "privileged communications."
(1) The Internal Revenue Service, the "small businessman," and
anyone else may choose the dual practitioner or not, as best suited
to his needs. Others may think and choose otherwise, rejecting the
lawyer-CPA both in law and in accountancy as being not well enough
qualified in either. The public has freedom of choice and the pub-
lic exercises that right; the lawyer, or the CPA, or the lawyer-CPA
must stand or fall, prosper or fail, on the merits of his competence
to satisfy the public need. If there is incompetence, the law pro-
vides remedies for it.71 The need of the public to be protected in
its right to select qualified services is as great as the public need
to be safeguarded against incompetence and unlawful practice.
69 News Report, J. Accountancy, March 1965, p. 9. at 12.
" Id., April 1965, p. 7, at 16.
71 See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 823 (1964) (incompetence as ground for disciplinary
action).
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I Businessmen generally have achieved an awareness of the need
to -enlist accounting as well as legal thought as aids to solution of
their problems; they will not view with sympathy any effort by
either profession to deprive them of direct and full access to the
talents of both, either singly or in combination.
(2) Some claim that there may be an inherent inconsistency in the
dual practice, a call for mutually exclusive talents: impartiality in
accountancy as opposed to advocacy in the law. Assuredly it is
true that success in the joint practice demands a high order of talents,
but so does attainment in the higher reaches of the law itself. Who
shall be the judges in our courts, if not members of the bar who have
capacity both for advocacy and impartiality? Who shall be chosen as
arbitrators, if not those who have such dual talent? In our complex
society, calling now for delicate negotiations and now for the
drafting of intricate contracts and now for opinions on abstracts
of title, what lawyer can hope to achieve high success without a
talent for being impartial when occasion demands? Is the bar pre-
pared to say that the lawyer must have a one-track mind, dedicated
wholly and solely to advocacy?71'
Does not tax practice itself demand of lawyer and of CPA and
of lawyer-CPA faithful impartiality in reporting and, as well, a
high order of advocacy to maintain and defend a choice among
competing concepts, at times in accounting and at times in law?
Does not the CPA himself, purely in the domain of accountancy,
need to make a choice among competing accounting concepts-and
then staunchly defend that choice?72
We may concede that, for the lawyer-CPA, occasions of conflict
of interest may arise. For example, when he renders a certificate or
opinion in his audit report, after he has counselled as attorney on
one or more significant transactions involved, he may be obliged
to withdraw as an accountant. But situations of conflict of interest
7" 'In his planning, the lawyer aims at arrangements that will achieve the client's
immediate objectives, safeguard his larger interests, regularize the means by which his
objectives are achieved, and prevent him from becoming embroiled in legal contro-
versy. The lawyer in private practice is therefore not only an advocate, legal coun-
selor, and a draftsman, he is also something of a business and political
statesman, a management consultant, an ethical counselor, and a medium for form,
order, and cooperative activity." AMEinCAN BAR FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra note 54,
at 10.
7
"[11n counseling their clients both the attorney and the CPA should maintain
essentially the same attitude of objectivity." Comment, 19 LA. L. Rlv. 830, 838 (1959).
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are not unknown to the lawyer as a lawyer. Such occasions probably
arise with less frequency for the lawyer-CPA as such than for the
lawyer as lawyer. When they do occur, it is the lawyer-CPA who
suffers in his practice, not the client.
(3). As to privileged communications, we may note at the outset
that in a matter where the point is likely to be vital, the client will
probably not consult the CPA-lawyer, or even his regular counsel-
more likely he will seek a specialist in criminal law. In consequence,
the CPA-lawyer's practice, not the interests of the client, will
suffer. The risk of non-privilege is minimal, in view of the CPA
successes in the tax field. In any case, we deal here with aspects at
the periphery, not at the heart of the problem.
We should be careful not to overstate the limitations of the CPA
as to privileged communications nor to overstate the extent of the
privilege with respect to attorneys.78 By statute in thirteen states
or more, the CPA enjoys various degrees of privileged communica-
tion,74 and even in other states the privilege does apply where the
information is given to the CPA-lawyer as lawyer.7 5 In addition,
non-CPA-lawyers engage extensively in accounting work; when the
attorney renders such service, he occupies the same status as to
privilege as does the CPA-lawyer: "It seems established that when an
attorney acts as an accountant in particular transactions with a
client, the privilege which is ordinarily characteristic of attorney-
client communications is lost."76 Furthermore, the attorney's priv-
ileged status has significant limitations, notably where his account-
ing service or the independent CPA's work is performed prior to the
client's initial consultation with the lawyer.77
In summation, it appears that all factors point to the conclusion
that banning dual practice is contrary to the interests of the public.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualize any public good which is
served by the prohibition.
13 For an extensive discussion of these matters, see Subcommittee on the Attorney-
Client Privilege Study, Report, ABA Section of Taxation Bulletin, April 1965, p. 83.7 4 See 8 WioMoRe, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 533 n.22 (1961).
"Annot., 38 AL.R.2d 670 (1954); cf. United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp.
324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (extent of privilege of CPA-lawyer in tax case); In re Fisher,
51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (no privilege for accounting information given to lawyer);
Clayton v. Canida, 223 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (same).
" Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 670, 671 (1954). "The cases are in conflict regarding the
circumstances under which the attorney-client privilege extends to accountants."
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 125, 131 (1964).
1 See United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
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V
STATE BARS WHICH DISAGREE WITH OPINION 297
There are probably many more CPA-lawyers in New York than
in any other jurisdiction. It was the New York County Lawyers
Association that initiated the litigation in the celebrated Bercu
case, thus provoking the stormy controversy between the two pro-
fessions.78 Yet these New York Bar Associations were the first to
reject the view adopted by the ABA Ethics Committee that the
dual practice is unethical. In a joint opinion issued in 1950, the
New York County and City Bar Associations concluded that the
dual practice and the dual designation are entirely proper, pro-
vided that the dual practitioners "in the practice of their profes-
sion as certified public accountants, adhere to the professional stan-
dards applicable to attorneys at law with respect to advertising
and solicitation."791
The New York Committees felt that dual designation was not
advertising. They expressly recognized the principle
that an attorney at law, acting as such, may not by any form or
medium of advertising, announce to the public at large that he has
a special skill in a particular branch of the law. This prohibition
extends to every type of publicity, including legends on office
doors, stationery, announcements, letters, circulars, etc.8 0
But the committees found no impropriety, for example, in placing
a legend on the office door designating the occupants as both law-
yers and CPAs. "In our opinion the proposed legends on the office
door would merely identify the firms occupying the premises and the
professions practiced by them therein, and would not constitute
either advertising or solicitation.., within the meaning of Canon
27.,81
The opinion of the New York City and New York County
committees on professional ethics has been adopted by the Nassau
Bar Association.82
See paragraph accompanying note 9 supra.
'
9 COMMrITrES ON PROFEsIONAL ETHics OF TnE NEW YoRK Crry BAR ASs'N & THE
NEW YoRK CouNTY LAwyERS' Ass'N, OPINIONS 447 (1956) (County Opinion 388, 1950;
City Opinion 743, 1949).
80 Ibid.
a
1Ibid. The opinion is discussed in DRINKER 224-25, and in Note, 63 HARv. L. REv.
1457 (1950).8 2 Newsday (Long Island, New York), April 15, 1965.
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The Hennepin County (Minnesota) Ethics Committee con-
cluded in a well-considered opinion that "the dual practice by
itself and dual listings alone are not, under the facts presently
presented, in violation of the Canons of Ethics."'83 It rejected the
Opinion 297 interpretation as not binding "even though the Canons
of Ethics of the American Bar Association have been adopted by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota."' 4 It overruled the arguments
of "self-touting" and "feeder"; it stressed the public welfare; and it
adopted the New York view. This Minnesota committee suggested
the wisdom of separate letterheads and the like, but imposed no
such requirements.85
The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Idaho State Bar,
in an extensive opinion, decided that:
An attorney who is also qualified as a certified public accountant
may carry the designation "Certified Public Accountant" on his
office door, his professional card, and on his letterhead; and may
practice both professions from the same office, providing that he
adheres to the professional standards applicable to attorneys at
law with respect to advertising and solicitation. 86
In twenty-seven states the concurrent practice is either affirna-
tively approved by the bar committees or is not regarded as an
appropriate area of challenge in the public interest.8 7
VI
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Even if it were admitted that dual practice by a lawyer-CPA
should be suppressed as a matter of ethics, the enforcement of such
suppression by the courts in their supervisory role over the con-
duct of lawyers raises serious constitutional problems. Dual practice
may well be a constitutionally-protected right which cannot be
abridged.
8 Hennepin County (Minn.) Ethics Comm., Opinion on Dual Practice by Attorneys
and CPAs, May 28, 1964.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
8 COMMI'TEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IDAHO STATE BAR, OPINION No. 10, in The Ad-
vocate (Idaho State Bar Foundation), April 1959, p. 4.87 Informal correspondence between the bar associations of the several states and
members of the American Association of Attorney-Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
has been summarized, showing that the bar committees in 27 states have taken no
position with respect to the concurrent practice; that 6 other states are indecisive; and
that in most of the 15 states where the bar committees have declared in favor of
Opinion 297, no meaningful Implementation is in evidence.
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The state cannot arbitrarily limit the practice of law, even
though it can place restrictions thereon.88  "We need not enter
into a discussion of whether the practice of law is a 'right'
or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permis-
sion to engage in this profession is characterized, it is suffi-
cient to say that a person cannot be -prevented from practicing ex-
cept for valid reasons."89 "We recognize the importance of leaving
States free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that
the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory
manner nor in such way as to impinge on the freedom of political
expression or association."8 0
It is true that the statements quoted above come from cases where
some first amendment right was involved, and that in the absence
of an infringement of such preferred rights, the Supreme Court has
in recent years been most hesitant to interfere with legislative
judgments where the interest involved is a purely commercial
one.91 On the other hand, the freedom of the lawyer to operate in
8 "A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or profidency in its law ... but any qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. ... Even in ap-
plying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there
is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their
action is invidiously discriminatory." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 239 (1957). Cf. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963);
Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). But cf. Martin
v. Walton, 568 U.S. 25 (1961) (per curiam).
It is possible that in some areas of practice the lawyer-CPA will be completely
insulated from state interference. In Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the
petitioner had been enjoined by Florida from preparing and prosecuting patent ap-
plications because he was a non-lawyer and his activities constituted the unauthorized
practice of law in Florida. The Supreme Court reversed on the basis of the supremacy
clause because petitioner was registered to practice by the United States Patent Office.
The case is significant for two reasons. First, it would clearly seem to permit CPAs,
and hence lawyer-CPAs, who are licensed to practice before the Treasury Department,
to engage in tax work even if doing so violates state law. See Dean Griswold's com-
ments in Proceedings of the Assembly: 86th Annual Meeting, Chicago, 49 A.B.AJ. 980,
992 (1963). Second, the case perhaps gives some indication of the Supreme Court's
disfavor of the practice of granting an individual the right to engage in professional
activity with the one hand, and restricting that right with the other.
If the ABA itself attempted to impose sanctions on the lawyer-CPA, such as
barring him from ABA membership, the attempt might be unconstitutional. See
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); Kurk v.
Medical Soc'y, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra note 88, at 239 n.5.-
00 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957).
61 E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), where the Court refused to declare
invalid a statute forbidding non-lawyers from engaging in debt adjusting: "Unques-
tionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has social
Vol. 1966: 117]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the best interests of the public seems to include elements which
transcend the commercial scene . 2 In this connection, NAACP v.
Button 3 and especially Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia94 indicate an awakening of the proposition that there is
a deep public interest in having available adequate legal aid in
whatever form the public requires it.9Y While both of these cases did
involve the protection of some group's first amendment rights,
they nevertheless indicate that perhaps the Court will not refuse
to strike down limitations on the activities of lawyers which tend
to violate the due process and equal protection clauses, despite
the Court's recent general attitude in commercial cases.90
It is also highly possible that the Court's "hands off" attitude
in commercial regulation is inapplicable in the situation at hand.
When the courts of a state (or the local bar associations) adopt a
rule banning the dual practice, there is a serious problem in the
separation of powers-it is not the legislature which is adopting
utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us." Id.
at 731. "If the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid it." Id. at 732-33. (Footnote omitted.) Cf. William-
son v. Lee Optical, Inc., 848 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). But cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
92 This same argument, of course, can be and has been made in any case of com-
mercial regulation. However, the important role which lawyers in the United States
have traditionally played in protecting the fundamentals of our system seems to place
regulation of them in a more preferred position than the ordinary merchant or
businessman.
"3871 U.S. 415 (1963). The Court invalidated as an unconstitutional restriction
on freedom of association an effort by Virginia to suppress the NAACP's practice of
encouraging and providing legal counsel for litigation to secure constitutional
rights of Negroes.
9377 US. 1 (1964). Citing NAACP v. Button, the Court invalidated Virginia's
suppression of a union's practice of encouraging suits by its members and their
families against the railroads for employee injuries, and of recommending specified
lawyers for such suits.
a"Cf. the following language from Kurk v. Medical Soc'y, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790,
801-02, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520, 581 (Sup. Ct. 1965), in which the court compelled the de.
fendant society to admit the plaintiff to membership: "Mhe offending provisions bf
the society's constitution and by-laws are void not only because they violate the
fundamental rights of the petitioner as an individual, but also because, in addition,
the public is also injured to the extent that it is restricted in its free and voluntary
choice of a physician. In United States v. American Med. Assn. (110 F.2d 708, 712,
cert. den. 310 U.S. 644) the court succinctly stated its concern for the public weal in
matters such as this when it said (p. 712): 'Restraints prohibited... are those which
unduly hinder a person from employing his talents . . . in any lawful undertaking
and thus keep the public from receiving . . . services as freely as it would without
such restraints.'"
"o This is suggested by McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. Rxv. 34, 58-62. Cf. Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 34 U.S.L. W=,c 4305 (U.S. March 24, 1966).
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the policy, and hence the usual power of the electorate and all mem-
bers thereof to maintain an influence on the policy adopted is ab-
sent.97 When it is solely the judiciary which is formulating the
policy, the Supreme Court's role is not so limited as it is when the
legislature has made the decision.
In combination with these factors is the point that a part of a
man's livelihood is being taken away from him. With increased
government regulation of a man's opportunity to make a living,
it is becoming increasingly important to maintain safeguards on the
possibility of arbitrary governmental action,98 and the Court is per-
haps becoming cognizant of this. Perhaps the fact that all the
recent Supreme Court decisions involving conduct of lawyers were
first amendment cases is unimportant; the language quoted at the
beginning of this section may mean exactly what it says.
If in fact the Court would, therefore, be willing to review the
reasonableness of the dual practice ban, it would appear that the
ban could not pass constitutional muster. So far as due process is
concerned, not only does there seem to be no rational basis for this
serious limitation on the activity of lawyers, as has been previously
pointed out in this article,99 but in addition:
1. There is an adequate alternative available which does not
so seriously limit the individual' 00-the continuing control of lawyers'
conduct exercisable by the judiciary whenever actual, not merely
potential, ethical transgressions occur. There is no indication that
this control has ever proved inadequate.
2. Lawyer-CPAs are denied an opportunity to be heard at the
time the policy is adopted, in a situation where they constitute a
fairly small group, the policy is directly aimed at them, and there
is an immediate and serious impact on their activities. 01
9 The separation of powers imposed by the Constitution on the federal govern-
ment is not, of course, binding on the states. However, the presence or absence of
a proper allocation of powers may indicate whether or not a deprivation of due
process exists. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957). Cf. United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
9 See generally Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 40 WASH. L. REv.
10 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
"9 See part III of this article.
100 "In a series of decisions, this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
101 See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). See generally I DAvis, AD-
MINismTivE LAw § 7 (1958).
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3. When the policy is adopted, the lawyer-CPA must either
abide by it or risk serious disciplinary sanctions by challenging it,102
unless the state has declaratory judgment machinery which would
somehow allow the CPA-lawyer to seek mandamus against the entire
judiciary to prevent them from enforcing the ban against him-a
difficult problem when the judiciary is deciding whether or not
to enjoin itself.
There also seems to be a violation of equal protection. No valid
reason can be formulated to justify singling out the lawyer who is
also a CPA for restrictive treatment without additionally banning
dual practice by, for example, the lawyer who is also a doctor.103
Remember that the dual practice is not allowed even by a CPA-
lawyer whose accounting business is unrelated to his law practice.
While "the reform may take one step at a time, ' 104 it is not the
legislature which is here acting-nor, as pointed out previously,
is the "evil" which is the subject of the reform an evil at all. The
situation thus dangerously approaches, indeed probably becomes, a
case of invidious discrimination. 0 5
These are difficult and largely unexplored constitutional prob-
lems. The foregoing exposition is not intended to be an exhaustive
study of them, for that would involve a whole article in itself, if
not more. But at the least, the arbitrary ban on dual practice
brings to the fore substantial and important constitutional inquiries.
CONCLUSION
The concurrent practice of law and accountancy, ethically con-
ducted in the true tradition of both professions, serves a genuine
public interest and suitably performs the proper functions of the
two professions. To suppress or restrict the dual practice would be
a disservice to the bar and to the public.
Contrary to Opinion 297, therefore, it is submitted that it is
permissible and not unethical for a lawyer who is also a certified
public accountant: (1) to engage concurrently in the practice of both
professions on his own account, in one office or in separate offices;
102 Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965): "Because of the sensitive
nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights."
23 See paragraphs accompanying and following note 54 supra.
10, Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 848 U.S. 488, 489 (1955).
100 See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). But see Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S.
25 (1961) (per curiam).
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(2) to identify himself as an attorney and as a certified public ac-
countant; (3) to so identify himself in professional directories, in
telephone directories (including the classified section), in city
directories, in building directories, on his office door or shingle, on
his letterheads, cards and other permissible professional announce-
ments, since these are appropriate professional identifications, not
multiple listings and not the advertisement of a specialty; (4) to be
a member of a law partnership with other lawyers; and (5) to be a
member of a CPA partnership with other CPAs.
